Security protocols for Secret Santa by Mauw, Sjouke et al.
Security protocols for Secret Santa
Sjouke Mauw, Sasˇa Radomirovic´, and Peter Ryan
University of Luxembourg
Faculte´ des Sciences, de la Technologie et de la Communication
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359, Luxembourg
1 Introduction
The original motivation for the current report lies in a number of questions
concerning the current state of the art in security protocol design and analysis.
Why is it so hard to develop a complete set of security requirements for a par-
ticular problem? After more than twenty years of research on, e.g., e-voting, we
have reached a state in which still confusion exists about which properties an
e-voting protocol should satisfy. What did we learn from this research experience
on e-voting? Can we apply the knowledge accumulated in this domain to similar
domains and problems? In short, is there a methodology underlying the process
of understanding a security protocol domain?
One could argue that such a methodology would not exist, because security
requirements analysis is an instantiation of the general problem of requirements
analysis and thus suffers from the same problems, such as ambiguity, incomplete-
ness and implicit assumptions. Nevertheless, security protocol history shows that
there are several patterns in the evolution of security requirements that can be
identified and from which we can learn.
As a first example we look at the development of the notion of privacy in
e-voting. While privacy initially amounted to vote secrecy, it was later on re-
fined into receipt-freeness, stating that a voter cannot prove whom he voted for.
Thus, privacy must be guaranteed, even if there is a reason for the voter to co-
operate with the adversary. The notion of receipt-freeness, in turn, was refined
into coercion resistance, capturing an even stronger form of cooperation with
the adversary. As a consequence of the shift from honest participants to partici-
pants showing several forms of dishonest behaviour, we see a shift of the security
requirements from basic privacy to enforced privacy. This drift towards insider
attacks was also at the basis of the well-known developments concerning the
Needham-Schroeder protocol. Likewise, we may even consider non-repudiation
as a form of authentication with a partially malicious agent.
A second class of examples comes from the discrepancy between the real-
world problem and the idealized abstraction of that problem. In the real world,
there are side-channels, a voter can be physically threatened and random-number
generators are predictable, while in the ideal world we consider such things as
noise when trying to solve the abstract problem.
Looking at the history of security protocols, we can make a distinction be-
tween three approaches towards requirements analysis. The first approach con-
sists of postulating a set of requirements, e.g., based on the similarity of the
problem with well-studied existing problems. The second approach is driven by
an analysis of possible threats. The set of all threats defines the unwanted be-
haviour and thus specifies the security requirements. Following Roscoe [4], these
approaches can be considered as extensional, i.e., they refer to the externally
observable effect. Achieving a complete specification in this way is rather hard.
The third approach starts by designing an ideal solution that explains how to
securely solve the problem under idealized assumptions. For instance, one may
assume a Trusted Third Party, resilient, secure and anonymizing communication
channels, trusted communication partners, etc. Such an ideal solution may be
considered as a specification of what the final solution should achieve. Again
using Roscoe’s terminology, this is a more intensional approach. One of the
problems with this approach is that it may suffer from over-specification.
The current state-of-the-art in the field of security protocol design is far from
providing clear and explicit answers to the questions raised above. Therefore, we
propose to study new, simple security protocol domains as to identify common
patterns in the domain analysis and apply them to new situations.
As a first exercise, we propose to study the Secret Santa problem. Secret
Santa is known in many western countries under different names, such as Chris
Kindle, sinterklaassurprises and julklapp. The informal description is as follows.
Members of a group are randomly assigned other members to whom they anony-
mously give a gift. In order to prevent cheating, simple protocols are used, such
as drawing strips of paper (with a name) from a hat. This is a centralized, proba-
bilistic solution. A non-probabilistic service is offered through various web sites,
but these require a TTP. An interesting question is whether there are distributed,
non-probabilistic solutions without TTP.
2 Related work
The Secret Santa protocol problem was first described by Gerard Tel in his text
book [6]. He describes a probabilistic, decentralized solution. One of his students
studied the problem in more detail and developed implementations of different
solutions [7]. Liberti and Raimondi studied the problem from a different point
of view. They are not proposing a protocol but an algorithm to determine if a
solution exists under certain constraints, including an anonymity requirement [3].
3 The Secret Santa problem
Basically, the Secret Santa problem boils down to anonymously establishing a
random derangement of the participants. In addition, we require that cheating
participants, i.e. those that don’t follow this derangement when buying a present,
can be identified. Formally,
Definition 1. Let P be a set of size N > 2, containing participants. A Secret
Santa protocol is a (distributed) protocol that establishes a function f : P → P
such that
1. (bijective) f is a bijection;
2. (irreflexive) ∀p∈P f(p) 6= p;
3. (random) f is random, i.e. none of the participants can influence the choice
of f in a non-random manner;
4. (anonymous) A group of conspiring participants Q ⊆ P will not learn more
about function f than can be deduced from {f(q) | q ∈ Q}.
5. (verifiable) If there is a participant p′ ∈ P who has not received a present
after the exchange, we can identify the cheater, i.e. the participant p ∈ P for
which f(p) = p′.
These requirements seem to easily follow from the (short and informal) prob-
lem description. But there were several choices made that led up to the formula-
tion presented above. For instance, we have taken the stance that in a real-world
Secret Santa protocol, there is nothing that can be done to prevent a group of
conspirators from exchanging their assignments. Thus the anonymity and veri-
fiability conditions express what we think is the best we can achieve.
Alternatively, we could have argued that unless there is a necessary trade-
off present in the requirements, we should always strive for the strongest set
of requirements. In this setting, we might state the verifiability requirement as
follows.
5’. (verifiable) After exchanging the presents it is verifiable that every cheating
participant p ∈ P , i.e. one that has not given a present to f(p), can be
identified.
Both of these formulations are based on catching cheaters. As a further al-
ternative to the verifiability requirement, we could consider forcing participants
to prove compliance.
5”. (verifiable) After successfully executing the protocol, every participant p ∈ P
can prove that the image of p is indeed f(p).
Aside from the problem of finding the “right” formulation for these require-
ments, it is not even evident that the list is complete. Indeed, why are notions
similar to receipt-freeness, coercion resistance, abuse-freeness and universal veri-
fiability left out? Do we need to require a fairness property stating that whenever
a participant gives a present, he will eventually receive a present?
Since correctness of a security protocol is relative to a particular adversary
model, a specfication of the adversary model must also be provided. We assume a
Dolev-Yao adversary model with conspiring participants. Alternatively, we could
have chosen honest but curious participants. This would mean that they strictly
follow the protocol, but nevertheless try to learn other participant’s secrets, e.g.,
by performing some extra local calculations. The discrepancy between the real
world and the idealized world shows because we ignore covert channels that may
appear when people bring or open presents.
4 Solutions
In this section we sketch several solutions for the Secret Santa problem. The
traditional solution is to draw strips of paper from a hat. This is a probabilistic
protocol, since a participant may draw his own name. Further, the protocol is
centralized and it does not require a trusted third party.
4.1 Trusted Third Party
The obvious solution is to use a trusted third party which will generate a random
derangement f and securely communicate f(p) to participant p. The trusted
third party will then receive from p the present for f(p) and distribute the
presents to the participants. The following algorithm will (deterministically)
generate a random derangement.
D := P ;
R := P ;
while D 6= ∅
do p := any(D);
if |D| = 2 ∧ |R ∩D| = 1 ∧ p 6∈ R ∩D
then f(p) := random(D − {p});
else f(p) := random(R− {p});
fi;
D := D − {p};
R := R− {f(p)};
od;
This solution satisfies requirements (1) through (5), but neither (5′) nor (5′′).
For (5′) the trusted third party must keep the participants in isolation for the
duration of the protocol. For (5′′) each participant p would need to be given a
receipt signed by the trusted third party.
4.2 Decentralized solutions
We give brief descriptions of a couple of decentralized solutions heuristically
satisfying the requirements of Definition 1.
We denote by {m, r}k an ElGamal encryption of a plaintext m with random
number r and key k. Thus k = (G, q, g, y), where G = 〈g〉 is a cyclic group of
order q in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable, and y = gs,
s secret. The notation {m, r}k then corresponds to the pair (g
r, yrm). If we want
to be less explicit with respect to the random factor introduced or the public
key, we will simply leave them out, writing {m} instead of {m, r}k.
ElGamal encryption has the following homomorphic properties:
{m1, r1} · {m2, r2} = {m1m2, r1 + r2}
and
{m1, r1}
n = {mn1 , r1 · n}.
The decentralized secret santa protocol now runs as follows.
1. Setup.
The participants generate a public key pk = (G, q, g, y) for the ElGamal cryp-
tosystem such that only large enough coalitions of participants may recover
the corresponding private key. All encryptions are performed using pk. The
participants are labeled 1 through N and assigned the elements g1 through
gN ∈ G, respectively. The participants publicly form encryptions of each of
the elements in the set {g1, . . . , gN}. Thus the vector 〈{g1}, {g2}, . . . , {gN}〉
is obtained.
2. Shuﬄe.
Each participant gets to do a re-encryption shuﬄe of the vector. Thus they
end up with
〈{gpi(1)}, {gpi(2)}, . . . , {gpi(N)}〉
for some permutation pi of the set {1, . . . , N}.
The participants can be kept honest during this step using Furukawa and
Sako’s scheme for proving correctness of a shuﬄe [1].
3. Derangement test.
Form the vector
〈({gpi(1)}/{g1})r1 , . . . , ({gpi(N)}/{gN})rN 〉,
where r1,. . . ,rN are some random values all participants contribute to. One
entry will be {1} if and only if pi is not a derangement. If pi is not a derange-
ment, go to step 2. Since the number of derangements of an n-element set is
equal to the nearest integer to n!/e [5], only a few repetitions of steps 2 and
3 are expected.
4. Commitment.
Towards requirement 5 of Definition 1, each participant i chooses a random
number ρi and submits its encryption {ρi} as well as the encryption of its
hash {H(ρi)} as a commitment. (H denotes a publicly known cryptographic
hash function.) Then the vector v = 〈{gpi(1)ρ1H(ρ1)}, . . . , {g
pi(N)ρNH(ρN )}〉
is formed and noted for the verification step. The purpose of the hash of ρi
is to prevent cheating by modifying ρi later.
5. Revealing pi(i) to participant i only.
Each participant i blinds {gpi(i)}. Then all terms are decrypted and each
participant i recovers pi(i).
Note that recovering pi(i) from gpi(i) will not be a problem, because all pi(i)
will be numbers from 1 to N , where N is the number of participants in the
scheme.
6. Presents.
Each participant i attaches ρi imprinted on a label to the present for pi(i)
to prove compliance with his assignment i→ pi(i).
7. Verification.
The participants form the vector 〈{gpi(1)ρ1H(ρ1)}, . . . , {g
pi(N)ρNH(ρN )}〉
and create a reencrypted permutation of its entries. Call this reencrypted,
permuted vector u.
The participants check whether for each of the entries vi of the vector v there
is one entry uj in u such that uj/vi = {1}.
That is, they compute for each participant i the vector 〈u1/vi, u2/vi, . . . , uN/vi〉
and check whether one of the entries is {1}. If none of the entries is {1}, the
participant must be a cheater.
A couple of variant solutions. If we permit ourselves the use of a fully
homomorphic crypto algorithm, such as that presented in [2], we can make the
above protocol more efficient by replacing the N plaintext equivalence tests
(PET) above by a simple PET. As before, we compute the {pi(i)− i} using the
additive homomorphism. Now we exploit the multiplicative homomorphism to





If λ is PET equivalent to {0} then we know that there is at least one fixed
point and so the permutation is not a derangement. If λ is not an encryption of
0, then we know that the permutation is a derangement but nothing further.
If we want to avoid the N PET tests but prefer not to use a fully homomor-
phic encryption scheme, we can use another approach that exploits verifiable
parallel permutations. Suppose that our encryption algorithm satisfies only a
multiplicative homomorphism, ElGamal for example.
We start by constructing publicly a vector w that is simply the encryptions
of the first N prime numbers in order, denoted pi:
〈{p1}, {p2}, . . . , {pN}〉
As before, we generate a secret permutation of w in a distributed fashion with
each participant contributing a shuﬄe. Call the vector representing this shuﬄe
w′. Now a vector z is created that is the encryption of the values 1 through N
in order:
We now parallel shuﬄe these two vectors to get the two shuﬄed vectors w′






If, when we decrypt λ we find that its factorisation includes at least one
occurrence of each of the first N primes then we have a derangement. Given
that we applied identical shuﬄes to w and z we know that if the shuﬄe applied
to w is a derangement then so is that applied to z.
Where wi denotes the ith component of the vector w.
4.3 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to stress the problem of requirements analysis
for security protocols. In order to make a step towards a methodology for the
understanding of security protocol problems, we propose to conduct a series of
case studies on new problems. We used the Secret Santa problem as an exer-
cise and discussed requirements and some possible solutions. Although we think
that we have identified the most interesting requirements they are not arguably
complete. As indicated, there are several ways in which the set of requirements
can be extended and there are different variations of the given requirements. It
is also interesting to formalize the requirements and the proposed solutions as
a first step towards formal verification. An interesting question is also to design
efficient non-probabilistic decentralized solutions. By studying the relation be-
tween the TTP-based ideal solution and the decentralised solutions one could
achieve a better understanding of the different requirements analysis approaches
that we identified.
An interesting approach for identifying new case studies could be found in
the distributed algorithms literature, which is rich of problems that in addition
to the functional requirements often have a security dimension as well.
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